Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a single central data aggregator can design mechanisms to ensure it receives high quality data from a collection of users, even when the sources have an aversion to producing and reporting such estimates to the aggregator. However, we have shown that these mechanisms often break down in more realistic models, where multiple data aggregators are in competition for the users' data. We formulate the competition that arises between the aggregators as a game, and show this game admits either no Nash equilibria, or a continuum of Nash Equilibria. In the latter case, there is a fundamental ambiguity in who bears the burden of incentivizing different data sources. We are also able to calculate the price of anarchy, which measures how much social welfare is lost between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, i.e. between non-cooperative strategic play and cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of smart sensors in recent years has introduced the possibility of accurately detecting and estimating a large new class of phenomena that affect society. These sensors, ranging from smart personal devices to more traditional purpose-built sensors, may be owned by a multitude of sources, and can produce qualitatively different readings which can be combined to make inferences about our world.
In turn, this has led to the advent of crowd sensing, wherein a central data collector accrues the measurements made by a multitude sources, using these data points to generate a single cohesive estimate for some phenomena of interest. However, the quality of this central estimate, and thus its value to the data collector, depends fundamentally on the ability, and moreover the willingness, of the data sources to produce and report accurate readings to the aggregator.
Unfortunately, there may be instances where data sources have some aversion to providing the data collector with the quality of estimates she desires. Take as an example, the case where the sensor must exert significant resources to produce an accurate reading (e.g. time or network bandwidth), or a situation where the source views the information she is sharing as private, and has incentive to obfuscate the data she shares [1] , [2] . Consequently, in order to ensure she consistently receives high quality measurements from the data sources, the central data collector must design an incentive mechanism which 1) allows her to metricize the quality of the reading each data source provides, and 2) provides incentive for the data sources to produce readings which are considered "high quality" under this metric.
Given the wide range of applications and industries this problem affects, many different compensation mechanisms have been proposed to promote the production of high quality readings from a collection of data sources. An overview of such mechanisms is given in [3] .
The contribution of this paper can be seen as an extension of [4] , in which the authors design a general payment mechanism, by which a central data collector may induce each data source in the marketplace to exert precisely the level of effort in collecting data that the central data buyer desires, wherein the buyer balances the cost of procuring high quality data from various sources against its value to her. Several other papers [5] , [6] further investigate mechanisms of this sort, proposing several extensions.
However, it has yet to be studied how such mechanisms perform in situations where more than one central data buyer wishes to purchase readings from data sources in the marketplace. A number of important questions arise when such data markets are considered. If the central data buyers are competing companies, will they permit data sources to also sell information to their competitors? If the data buyers do purchase readings from the same set of data sources, who will foot the bill to incentivize the effort the data sources exert? Will the data buyers who provide larger payments to the data sources be compensated with higher quality readings than their competitors?
In this paper we provide answers to these questions by analyzing the competitive outcomes that arise in such a marketplace by formulating a game between the buyers wherein they 1) compete by designing pricing mechanisms from [4] to affect the behavior of the data sources, and 2) design these mechanisms so as meet the personal objectives enumerated above.
We derive conditions for the existence of Nash Equilibria in this game when a particular form is assumed, and analyze the efficiency and equity of these outcomes. We demonstrate through both analytical and numerical exercises that the outcomes of these games are often highly inefficient from a social standpoint, which motivates future work to design incentive mechanisms which more effectively handle competition between data buyers. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we lay out explicit mathematical structures for the data markets, strategic data sources, strategic data buyers, and the class of contracts we will consider between the sources and buyers.
In Section III, we analyze the game that forms between the buyers in the data market, and demonstrate that the outcome of this game is in many cases socially inefficient. Section IV provides a numerical example which highlights the issues presented in Section III. And finally, Section V prescribes an agenda for future work, with the aim of developing more refined incentive mechanisms which do not suffer from the same shortcomings in the competitive setting.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
We formulate our model for data markets. We first present our model for strategic data sources, and then strategic buyers who issue incentives with the structure from [4] to the data sources. Then, we define our overall game, as well as a generalized Nash equilibrium for this game.
A. Data market
At a high level, a data market consists of a set S = {1, ..., N } of strategic data sources, and a set B = {1, ..., M } of strategic data buyers. Each data source i is equipped to generate an estimate of the function f : D → R at some data point x i ∈ D, and each data buyer j ∈ B wishes to use these readings to generate a personal estimator of f , which we will denotef j . Each buyer j is willing to form a contract with each data source i ∈ S, which monetarily compensates i for the readings she produces, and we assume it is under the purview of j to define the structure of this contract.
One may think of D as a set of features or events the data buyers are capable of observing. The value returned by the mapping f encapsulates the relationship between the observable features and the outcome of interest to the aggregators. We further assume that each of the data sources and buyers acts strategically; that is, each of these agents acts to optimize some expected personal return from her transactions in this marketplace. The following two subsections of the document provide an explicit mathematical formulation describing the behavior of the data sources and data buyers. The basis for these definitions comes directly from [4] .
B. Strategic data sources
We now define our model for strategic data sources. Intuitively, data sources provide data samples (x, y) whose variance depends on their effort. Thus, the more effort exerted, the better the statistical estimation for any data buyer who receives the data. Additionally, we assume the data sources are effort-averse, i.e. all else equal, they prefer to exert minimal effort. Furthermore, the buyer has no direct way to verify the amount of effort exerted by the data source. Thus, we have an issue commonly referred to as moral hazard.
More formally, all data sources share some function f : D → R, where f is the function which data buyers wish to estimate. Each data source i has their own feature x i ∈ D and their own cost-of-effort function σ 2 i : R → R + . When data source i exerts effort e i ∈ R, they produce an estimate of the form:
Both x i and σ 2 i are common knowledge, but the effort e i is private, as well as the the value y i (e i ) produced. Data source i will receive a payment from each buyer for their data. For buyer j, let this payment, potentially random, be denoted p j i . We assume that the data source has a utility function of the following form, should they opt-in:
If they opt-out, they will receive utility 0. Note that this assumes that the data sources are risk-neutral, effort-averse, and must opt-in ex-ante. Additionally, we assume the effort e i can be normalized to be comparable to the payments. Throughout the rest of this paper, we shall often omit the argument e i when context makes it evident.
C. Strategic data buyers
A strategic data buyer j ∈ B is an agent who wishes to construct the best estimatorf j for a function f . She optimizes a loss function across a class of estimators, which the data buyer is free to select. In general, different buyers need not fit models of the same type; for example, one data buyer may choose to generate her estimator via linear regression, while another data buyer constructs his estimator by fitting the data to a polynomial model of higher degree. Differences in the type of estimator data buyers use may be used to encapsulate competitive advantages one data buyer has over another. For a more thorough review of the technical requirements of these estimators, see [4] . Additionally, each data buyer j has a distribution F j across D, which denotes how much they value an accurate estimate at various points in D.
In particular, letf
denote the estimator that buyer j constructs, based on the location of the data sources, x, and the reports she receives from the data sources, y j . (Here, x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and similarly y j is the vector of y values reported to buyer j.)
Beyond any intrinsic utility buyer j experiences from increasing the quality of her estimator, j also wishes to construct an estimator that is more accurate than the estimators constructed by her competitors, the other members of B.
Each data buyer j commits to a payment function p j i to each data source i ∈ S, where p j i : D N × R N → R may depend not only on the reading reported by data source i, but also the readings reported by the other members of S, with consideration given to the features of the data sources. In particular, buyer j constructs her various contracts with the data sources so as to minimize:
The expectation in (2) is taken across x * ∼ F j as well as the randomness in the reported data y k for k ∈ B (recall that F j weighs the importance data buyer j places on an an accurate estimator about different points x * ∈ D). Here, as per typical game theory notation, we will let −i denote S \ {i} and −j denote B \ {j}, and when −i or −j is used as a subscript, this denotes everyone else's variables, e.g. p −j denotes the vector of payment plans of all the data buyers that are not j.
Here, δ j k ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes the level of competition between buyers j and k, and we assume this competition is symmetric so δ
, j is indifferent to the success of k, and competes with k only insofar as trying to determine who will pay to incentive the data sources. The parameter η j > 0 denotes a conversion between dollar amounts allocated by the payment functions and the utility generated by the quality of the various estimators that are constructed.
In order for the objective expressed in (2) to be well defined, we assume that buyer j chooses to construct an estimator for which there exists a function g j such that, for all distributions F j over D, x, and σ 2 ∈ R N :
Here the y j have variance σ 2 . Finally, we assume that buyer j has knowledge of what class of estimator each of the other data buyers plans to use. The contracts offered by the buyers must be designed such that, for each data source i, when i selects her effort e i to maximize to (1), given the payment contracts from all of the other data buyers:
This first constraint ensures the collection of contracts offered to i is ex-ante individually rational, while the second constraint ensures each individual contract offered to i is ex-ante individually rational. We model the resulting competition between the data buyers, subject to these coupled constraints, as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) [7] . Definition 1. Each player j from a finite set of players B aims to solve an optimization problem given by: Having laid out the general formulation for this problem, in the final portion of this section we lay out the form of the payment contracts that we consider between the buyers and sellers of data.
D. Structure of payment contracts
In [4] the particular case where |B| = 1 is analyzed, and no competition between buyers of data must be considered. Their work considers payment plans from the single buyer to each data source i of the form:
wheref ( x, y)−i (x i ), is the optimal estimate for f (x i ) that the data buyer can construct from the readings reported by the data sources other than source i, and c i ≥ 0, d i ≥ 0 are scalars to be chosen strategically by the buyer. The authors of [4] demonstrate an algorithm for selecting c i and d i which allows the buyer to: 1) precisely incentive data source i to exert any level of effort e i that the buyer desires (the authors can make e i a dominant strategy for data source i), and 2) precisely compensate data source i for her effort (Ep i (y i ( e i ), y −i ( e −i )) = e i , making the contract tightly satisfy individual rationality constraints). Our goal is to study how pricing schemes of this form perform in the more general case where |B| > 1, and competition between multiple data buyers becomes a critical consideration. In particular, we assume the following form for each of the incentive mechanisms offered in the data market. Note that these payments do not directly depend on the level of effort that any of the data sources exert, since the data buyers do not have a means to directly observe these values. The payments only depend on the data reported to them, and can be calculated by data buyers. Having defined the necessary structures for the data markets we wish to study, we are now ready to study the competitive equilibria that arise in these marketplaces.
Assumption 1. Consider a data buyer j and data source i.

It is assumed that j offers i a payment function of the form
First, we note that for any data source i, due to the form of the payment contract, they will report the same value to all data buyers. This will become obvious through our following analysis, as it will be shown that the payments the data sources receive are strictly decreasing in the variance of their reported readings. We denote the this common reported reading y i .
III. RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the behavior we can expect from each of the agents in the market place, by considering the game that forms between the members of B as they select the parameters in the contracts they offer to the data sources.
Adopting standard game-theoretic short-hand notion, we denote the set of pricing parameters buyer k selects by (c k , d k ) , and we denote the choice of the pricing parameters of the other members of B by (c
. From now on, we use the index k to single out a specific buyer, the index q to single out a data source, the index j to sum over a collection of buyers, and the index i (and sometimes l) to sum over a collection of sources.
We begin our analysis by determining under what conditions the data sources will accept the collection of contracts offered to them by the data buyers. Recall that data source q will accept all of the contracts offered by the data sources if and only if the ex-ante total payments are non-negative (4) and each data buyer's payment is non-negative ex-ante (5).
Let δ x denote the probability measure that puts mass 1 at point x. Then, we may simplify (4) for a fixed q by noting that:
Then, (4) holds if and only if:
Similarly, (5) holds if and only if:
As our goal is to find situations where the buyers receive data from each of the data sources, we shall include equations (9) and (10) as constraints in the game between data buyers. Indeed, given a choice of (c −k , d −k ), the objective of buyer k is to optimize the following problem:
Each constraint holds for all i ∈ S. Recall that J k was defined in (2) . Note that [4] showed that the payments induce dominant strategies, so (13) is an optimization that does not depend on e −i .
In general, this may be a computationally difficult problem for j ∈ B to solve. For illustrative purposes, for the rest of this paper we will assume specific forms for the estimators the buyers employ and the σ functions which define the data sources.
Assumption 2. For each data source q, σ q (e q ) is characterized by the the constant α q > 0 and of the form:
Note that this implies that σ is convex, strictly decreasing and always positive, which are all desirable properties in our context. Letting d . We leave the necessary details to [8] , which also contains the necessary algebra demonstrating a number of simplifications we are about to make.
Assumption 3. (Separable estimators) For each buyer k ∈ B, the estimator for f that buyer k employs,f k , is separable. In other words, there exists a function h k such that:
Where h is non-negative.
Note that linear regression, polynomial regression and finite-kernel regression all produce separable estimators. Applying Assumption 3 for the estimators, we may rewrite the loss function for buyer k as:
Recall that each x i is fixed and common knowledge; thus, we can replace each of the above evaluations of the h functions with constants. Define β
In efforts towards succinctness, let γ
Finally, similar reasoning lets us write for any data source q and data buyer k:
Collecting these simplifications, and also using our expressions for e * q and σ 2 q (e * q ), buyer k has the following optimization problem:
Every constraint above holds for all i ∈ S. Also, note that without loss of generality, we can take η k = 1, by normalizing the γ k i accordingly. The following intermediate result is used in the proof of our two main theorems. We leave proofs for each of these claims to [8] .
Lemma 1. Suppose ( c, d) is a GNE for the game defined by (17). The following equality holds for all i and k:
c k i = j∈B d j i l∈S ξ j i,l 2d total l α l + ln 2d total i α i 2α i − j∈−k c j i
In other words, (18) is always tight in equilibrium.
We now characterize the GNE solutions that arise in the game between the buyers. 
The effort exerted by each data source is the same in each generalized Nash equilibrium.
We first discuss the assumption that γ j i ≥ 0. This implies that, for each data buyer, the penalty for other data buyer's successful estimation does not outweigh the benefit of having a good estimator. This assumption means that no data buyer will have incentive to drive the variance of one data source up towards infinity.
In the proof of Theorem 1 it is demonstrated that the existence (or non-existence) of GNE solutions depends solely on the ξ parameters, and is independent of the γ parameters. Loosely speaking, the γ parameters denote the level of demand the data buyers have for low-variance data from each of the data sources, while the ξ parameters represent a level of coupling that exists between the payment contracts offered by the buyers. This implies that the existence or nonexistence of GNE in this game is simply an artifact of the incentive mechanisms we have chosen to analyze, and does not depend on whether or not there are solutions that are beneficial to all parties involved.
Additionally, note that, in the case where there is a continuum of GNE, the ambiguity arises in the c parameters. In other words, the ambiguity arises in determining which data buyers will pay to ensure that each data source's total compensation covers the cost of their effort. In the extreme case, it is possible for one firm to pay for the entirety of the expected compensation offered to the data sources, while the other firms pay nothing on expectation. That is, for some k ∈ B, i∈S p k i ( x, y) = i∈S e * i , and for all j = k, i∈S p j i ( x, y) = 0. In Section V we discuss possible mechanisms to alleviate the disparity that may arise in these situations.
We next turn to analyzing the total utility experienced in the marketplace for a given outcome of the game. We begin with the following definition. 
Note that this sum does not include any of the payments made in the marketplace, as they are simply lossless transfers of wealth. We require the additional assumption that η j = 1 for all buyers j to ensure that these transfers of wealth are lossless from a utility perspective, i.e. the buyers and sources value the payment equally. This assumption allows us to isolate the social loss due to the mechanism, and ignore any losses due to differential preferences in payment currency. Theorem 2 shows that there is always some social loss, exante, from a Nash solution compared to the social optimum when there exists any coupling between the contracts the data buyers offer to the data sources. Note that the social welfare is always lost because the effort induced in equilibrium is higher than is socially optimal. This captures the intuition that each data buyer has a negative externality: they wish to improve their estimates without considering how their improved estimates hurt other data buyers. This adverse affect on the other buyers occurs due to the coupling between the payments made in the market place.
IV. EXAMPLE: BETWEEN TWO FIRMS
In this section, we present an example which demonstrates how a data market may collapse as the parameters of the system are varied. In particular, we consider the case where there are two data sources (s 1 and s 2 ) and two firms acting as data buyers (b 1 and b 2 ) . Each of the data sources is capable of estimating the function
Let x 1 , x 2 ∈ [−1, 1] denote the locations where s 1 and s 2 sample f , respectively. Assume that each of the data sources are as defined in Assumption 2, with the characteristic parameters α 1 = α 2 = 1. Next, we assume that each of the data buyers is performing linear regression on f and take F 1 = F 2 as the uniform distribution on the domain of f , [−1, 1]. Given these parameters, and our previous computations, we can exactly calculate the equilibrium that arises in this data market. For illustrative purposes, we fix x 2 = 1, and see what happens to the data market as we vary x 1 along the interval [−1, 1]. Note that, when x 1 = x 2 = 1, it is no longer possible to construct a linear estimator of f because there is insufficient data. Thus, the example shows how the game between buyers behaves as it becomes increasingly difficult to construct good estimators. Figure 2 depicts the Price of Anarchy, defined to be L( e * )
L( ê)
, as we vary x 1 . Here, e * is the induced effort of the sensors in the Nash solution of the game between data buyers, and ê is the socially optimal effort for data sources to exert. . When x 1 = −1, the payments in the marketplace are decoupled and the ξ parameters are all zero; in this instance the price of anarchy is 1, and the market is perfectly efficient. However, as x 1 → 1, the price of anarchy diverges asymptotically to infinity, as the ξ parameters approach a value of 1, at which point the market collapses.
V. CLOSING REMARKS
We've analyzed the game that forms between a set of data buyers when they wish to communally incentivize a collection of strategic data sources, using a mechanism that has been proposed in the literature. We derived, for a particular form of the game, conditions for the existence of GNE, and demonstrated that these solutions are frequently socially inefficient. This motivates future work to develop a richer class of incentive mechanisms which alleviate these issues. Possible solutions include more complex pricing mechanisms, or perhaps the addition of a trusted third party market-maker to mediate socially beneficial transactions in these data markets.
